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An Evolutionary Game-Based Mechanism for Unwanted Traffic Control

  • Jia Liu
  • , Mingchu Li
  • , Zitong Feng
  • , Cheng Guo
  • , Lifeng Yuan
  • , Muhammad Alam

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Abstract

With the development of Internet technology and the pervasive use of internet service providers (ISPs), internet users have reached an unprecedented volume. However, the existence of some malicious users seriously undermine the environment of the network by distributing a large amount of unwanted traffic, such as spam, pop-up, and malwares, which can be identified with the cooperation of individual users by installing anti-virus toolkits. In our paper, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic incentive mechanism to promote the cooperation of individual users to curb the expansion of unwanted traffic. Considering the hierarchical nature of real-world management, we model our framework as hierarchical incentive mechanism and combine reward with punishment mechanism to further incentivize cooperative behavior. Meanwhile, the acceptance condition of our framework is analyzed and we carry out a number of simulations to analyze the acceptance conditions of our framework.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2nd EAI International Conference on Future Intelligent Vehicular Technologies October 17–19, 2017, Islamabad, Pakistan.
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages37-51
ISBN (Print)9783319999654, 9783319999661
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2019

Publication series

NameEAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing
PublisherSpringer Nature
ISSN (Print)2522-8595
ISSN (Electronic)2522-8609

Bibliographical note

This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99966-1_4

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