Competitive Outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock Contest

Matthew Robertson

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112285

Competitive Outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock Contest

Matthew Robertson

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Abstract

I endogenise the value of the prize in an N-player Tullock contest as the total market revenue obtained in Cournot competition under linear inverse demand. The contest designer, by choosing the parameter relating players’ outputs to their share of market revenue, can maximise total surplus by implementing the perfectly competitive outcome. In contrast, the parameter that maximises players’ payoffs leads them to produce one-half of the perfectly competitive output, which is equivalent to 1/N of the monopoly output.

Original language	English
Article number	112285
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	250
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112285
Publication status	Published - 21 Mar 2025

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 The Author

Keywords

Contest design
Cournot competition
Perfect competition
Tullock contest

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112285

1-s2.0-S0165176525001223-mainFinal published version, 753 KBLicence: CC BY 4.0

Cite this

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title = "Competitive Outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock Contest",

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