Dividend policy and bank opacity

Dung Viet Tran, Badar Nadeem Ashraf

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Does dividend policy increase or decrease bank opaqueness? Under the Dividend–Transparency Channel, paying dividends involves banks having greater discipline from the markets due to external financing and reduces private benefits of control, leading to lower earnings management concerns. Under the Dividend–Opacity Channel, due to a hesitancy to change dividend policy, banks have high vocations to engage earnings management to circumvent payout policy restrictions in debt covenants or to keep their dividend target unchanged. Employing a large sample of 2,483 U.S. bank holding companies from 2001:Q1–2013:Q4, the study documents the double-edged sword of dividends on the discretionary behaviours of banks. Paying dividends makes banks less opaque to compare with nonpayers, which is consistent with the Dividend–Transparency Channel, however among dividend paying banks, excessive dividends involve banks to manage more their numbers, which is consistent with the Dividend–Opacity Channel. The findings are robust under different specifications. The results are of important interest to bank regulators.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)186-204
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Journal of Finance and Economics
Volume23
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords

  • banks
  • discretionary loan loss provisions
  • dividends
  • earnings management
  • opacity
  • payout policy

Cite this