Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective

Roy Cerqueti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose an evolutionary game to analyze the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)458-463
JournalEconomics Letters
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 6 Jun 2013
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • C7
  • JEL classification
  • D7
  • Income distribution
  • Tolerance
  • Replicator dynamics

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