Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective

Roy Cerqueti

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032

Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective

Roy Cerqueti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose an evolutionary game to analyze the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	458-463
Journal	Economics Letters
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032
Publication status	Published - 6 Jun 2013
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

C7
JEL classification
D7
Income distribution
Tolerance
Replicator dynamics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032Licence: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

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title = "Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective",

abstract = "We propose an evolutionary game to analyze the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.",

keywords = "C7, JEL classification, D7, Income distribution, Tolerance, Replicator dynamics",

author = "Roy Cerqueti",

year = "2013",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032",

language = "English",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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AB - We propose an evolutionary game to analyze the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.

KW - C7

KW - JEL classification

KW - D7

KW - Income distribution

KW - Tolerance

KW - Replicator dynamics

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

SP - 458

EP - 463

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective

Abstract

Keywords

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